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Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria
Roger B. Myerson*
ABSTRACT
Schelling's concept of the focal-point effect in games with multiple
equilibria is among the most important ideas in social theory. When justice
is recognized as a criterion for identifying focal equilibria, we see how
justice can affect the rational behavior of selfish economic actors. The
foundations of political institutions can be understood in terms of focal
equilibrium selection in a more fundamental game. This paper probes these
ideas with some simple game-theoretic examples. Multiple equilibria are
analyzed in a rival-claimants game, and this coordination game is extended
to simple models of property rights, political institutions, boundaries, and
economic investment.
I. INTRODUCTION
How can justice influence the decisions of a rational economic agent? In
this paper, I seek a fundamental perspective on this question by considering
some simple game-theoretic models where people's treatment of each other may
be rationally guided by considerations of justice. In particular, this paper argues
that the rational supply of justice is essentially connected with questions of
multiple equilibria in games. More broadly, I argue here that the foundations of
any social institution may be understood in terms of more fundamental games
that have multiple equilibria.
Questions about the supply of justice are ancient in the literature of social
philosophy. We may begin with a definition of justice cited in Book 1 of Plato's
Republir that justice is giving each person what is due to him. But it is difficult
for economic theorists to accept Plato's subsequent suggestion that a good
society could create an ample supply of justice simply by educating its rulers to
love justice above all else. Such ideas of culturally-determined endogenous
preferences are very hard to assimilate into economic analysis because they hold
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the potential of trivializing all our questions about designing or reforming social
institutions. It is an economist's job to develop methodologies for analyzing how
changes in the structure of institutions may affect people's behavior and welfare.
In such questions, we do not want to assume that the problems of poverty could
be solved simply by educating the poor to develop a taste for their plight.
Virtually any institution could generate better social outcomes if everyone could
be motivated solely by a benevolent desire to raise the aggregate welfare of the
whole society. To avoid such trivialization of questions about institutional
reforms, most economic analysis has been based on a restrictive assumption that
individuals' fundamental motivations are generally selfish and materialistic. If an
institution cannot perform well under such an assumption, then we have
grounds for seeking to reform it. The great successes of economic analysis have
been based on this approach.
But if everyone is a selfish materialist, then how can anyone be motivated
to treat another person better simply because such better treatment is justly
"owed" to him? If there were only one decisionmaker in the world, then a
person who does not intrinsically care about behaving justly could be induced to
respond to demands of justice only if he were otherwise completely indifferent
among his behavioral options. Such complete indifference could not provide
more than a fragile basis for the supply of justice. But when we consider games
with many decisionmakers, we often find multiple equilibria. That is, many
different patterns of behavior among the players may be rationally sustained as
unique best responses to each other. In such situations, criteria of justice may be
a crucial determinant of each individual's rational behavior precisely because he
expects everyone else's behavior to be influenced by the same concepts of
justice. Thus, justice may be rationally supplied by selfish individuals because
justice is a criterion for selecting among equilibria of a game.
Although this point is simple, it may have been relatively neglected in
economic literature because of a methodological bias against studying games that
have many equilibria. When we find many equilibria, it seems that economic
analysis cannot make firm predictions, which may be a bit embarrassing to
professional economists. But I want to argue here that the supply of justice and
the foundations of social institutions can be understood only in the context of
games with multiple equilibria. In this regard, this paper is perhaps just an
amplifying echo of Thomas Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict, which, in its
Chapter 3, introduced the idea of focal coordination in games with multiple
equilibria.2 The main point of this paper may simply be the observation that
Schelling's focal-point effect needs to be understood as one of the great
fundamental ideas of social philosophy.
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The basic idea is a simple one. A Nash equilibrium is a possible prediction
of behavior for all players in a game such that, if every player believes that the
others will behave as predicted, then it is rational for each player himself to
behave according to this prediction.' Thus, any prediction which is not a Nash
equilibrium cannot be rationally accepted by the players as an accurate
description of what will happen in the game, because if everybody believed its
accuracy as a way of predicting others' behavior then at least one player would
want to violate the predictions himself. When we study a game that has only one
equilibrium, this equilibrium must be the only rational prediction of how the
players will behave, and so game theory seems very powerful. But games with
many equilibria seem a bit more difficult because this logic leaves us with many
possible predictions. Nash considered a simple bargaining game that had an
enormous multiplicity of equilibria, but he tried to get around this multiplicity by
studying mathematical properties that would characterize a unique equilibrium in
this set.4
In Schelling's view, however, such multiplicity of equilibria was not a
technical problem to be avoided, but a fact of life to be appreciated. In Chapter
3 of Strategy of Conflict, he led the reader to consider a long list of games, each
having many equilibria.'
Let us consider one introductory example that is similar to many in
Schelling's list. A group of players, all wearing name tags, are sitting in a circle.
Each must independently write one player's name on a piece of paper. If they all
write the same name then they each get $100, except that the person named gets
$200. Otherwise they all get $0. The players have never met each other before.
But just before they play, someone walks in, puts a big shiny crown on one
player's head, and walks away. Everybody can see the person with the crown and
can read his name tag. To get paid anything, the players need to coordinate, and
they might well coordinate by all naming the person with the crown. This idea,
once generally perceived, can become quite compelling. By focusing people's
attention on the equilibrium where everyone names this player, the crown can
create a social situation where everyone thinks that everyone will play according
to this equilibrium, and so everyone finds it in his own best interest to play
according to this equilibrium. That is, the crown may function as a self-fulfilling
prophecy that everyone will name the player wearing it. The crown has no
intrinsic effect on the payoff structure of the game, but it may affect each
player's rational decision by affecting his expectations about what others will do.
So in a game with multiple equilibria, the indeterminateness of Nash
equilibrium as a solution concept opens the door to other factors influencing the
3
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rational behavior of players. Anything that focuses everyone's attention on one
equilibrium may lead the players to expect this equilibrium and so to rationally
fulfill it. These focal factors could be anything in the environment or heritage of
the players, as long as they are all aware of it.
I suggested a crown in this story because crowns have functioned similarly
in traditional political institutions. Political agents need to agree about who is
their leader, and special crowns were used in ceremonial assemblies of medieval
Europe to indicate the person who is generally recognized as the national leader.
In a non-European culture where crowns have had no such meaning, but where
important leaders have been marked instead by the possession of a special staff,
giving such a staff to one of the players in this game might lead everyone to
name him, even when another player comes in with a fancy crown on his head.
So details of cultural traditions may be decisive in games with multiple equilibria.
Such dependence of focal equilibria on the players' shared culture should
not be seen as a failure of economic analysis. Instead, the role of culture as a
focal factor should be recognized as a primary mechanism by which culture can
influence rational economic behavior. People's understanding of justice is an
essential part of their cultural tradition, and if rational economic behavior were
independent of any cultural influences then justice would have no role in the
determination of economic behavior.
But these focal factors can only work if they focus the players on an
equilibrium. If we changed the payoffs in our first example so that each player
instead gets $100 for each time that his own name is written by anybody in the
game, then the unique equilibrium would be for each player to write his own
name. In this case, a crown on one player's head, no matter how big and shiny,
could not induce others to write his name instead of their own names.
II. TRUTHFUL EQUILIBRIA IN A SIMPLE REPORTING GAME
Before considering justice, let us start with truth. Consider a simple game
where three players are each given a device with two buttons on it, one labeled
"Yes" and the other labeled "No." Each player must independently decide
which button to press. If he presses a button with the same label as at least one
other player then he gets $100, but if he is the only person to push a button with
this label then he gets $0. Each player wants only to maximize his expected
monetary payoff.
This game has an equilibrium where they all choose Yes, but it has another
equilibrium where they all choose No. The focal-point effect suggests that their
behavior in this game may depend on payoff-irrelevant features of the
environment that the players all observe, including the broader cultural traditions
that they share. So let us add that, before making their decisions in this game,

Vol5No 1

Justice, Institutions,and Mulfiple Equilibria

Myerson

the players together are shown a picture and are asked a question about it: "Is
this a picture of Abraham Lincoln?"
Truthful reporting can be expected in this game when truth functions as
the focal coordinating device. With truth as the focal factor, the players should
all choose Yes if the picture is one that a reasonable person would believe to be
Abraham Lincoln, but otherwise they should all choose No. Of course this focal
understanding depends on many cultural conventions. The picture and question
could not have such a focal coordinating role if the players did not know who
Abraham Lincoln was, or if they did not understand the English language.
If the $100 payoff were changed to $1 or even to $0.01 (but players
remained solely motivated by the goal of maximizing expected monetary payoff),
then our analysis of the truthful equilibrium would remain the same. In this
sense, we find no lower bound on the cost of obtaining truth in this simple
social system.
Real reporting systems involve more complex systems of cross-checking
and auditing. But the role of truth in much social discourse can be understood as
a criterion for identifying the focal equilibrium in coordination games where
people are penalized for making statements that are inconsistent with other
testimony.
When there is a unique equilibrium, however, truth may lose this focalcoordination role. For example, suppose instead that each player would be paid
$100 when his selection was different from the other two players, but he would
get $0 if he matched one or more others. If there were no other sanctions
against "false" reports then the role of truth would vanish in this revised game,
where the unique equilibrium is to randomize between Yes and No with equal
probability.
III. JUSTICE FROM BASU'S TAXI DRIVER AND WARS OF ATTRITION
To introduce justice, let us consider a simple question posed by Kaushik
Basu in the introduction to his book on Anaytical Development Economics,6 where
he argued for the importance of culture as a factor in economic development.
Basu asked why a passenger should pay a taxi driver after getting out of the car,
in a city where she is visiting for one day. 7 One possible answer is that the driver
is likely to fight with the passenger if she does not pay. But that answer raises the
question of why the driver does not use the same threat to get a pedestrian to
pay similarly even without having ridden in the taxi.
Some social theorists might answer that, with a good social education,
drivers and passengers and pedestrians should all want to honor a Platonic
6
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definition of justice and give each person what is due. That is, passengers should
have acquired a sense of duty to pay, but pedestrians should feel no such duty;
and each should want to do her duty. As discussed above, this endogenouspreference approach seems a poor foundation for economic analysis. If this
were the only explanation, then we might conclude that justice is possible only
when people are trained to deviate from their selfish materialist impulses. We
need to know if there is some way that justice can be delivered by rational
people even when they are selfish materialistic individuals.
Let's dismiss one other cheap answer: that the passenger should pay
because a police officer might arrest her otherwise. We can dismiss this answer
simply by assuming that the two people are alone on the street. But our reason
for dismissing this answer is that, instead of simplifying the story, a police officer
would really complicate it. Relying on a police officer for enforcement would
beg the question of why the police officer should take the trouble of arresting a
passenger who does not pay, but not arresting a pedestrian who refuses to pay.
The police officer's motivations might depend on how his peers and superiors
behave in the Police Department, which is a complex social institution. Complex
social institutions are designed to provide justice in various forms. But we may
see the mechanisms of social justice more clearly if we limit ourselves at first to a
society that includes only two people confronting each other alone.
Let us consider a simple game that formally models this situation. To avoid
informational problems, let us assume that the passenger is known to have $20,
which also happens to be the fare displayed on the taxi meter. To make the
players' positions symmetrical, let us assume that the $20 has actually fallen out
the passenger's pocket and is on the ground between them. Now the driver and
the passenger each have a simple decision problem: to either claim the $20 or
leave it and depart empty-handed. When a player leaves, his or her payoff is $0.
If one player claims the money and the other player leaves, then the claiming
player gets the $20 prize. If both players claim the money, then neither gets the
prize and they suffer a cost of conflict worth some amount $c to each of them.
Let V = 20 denote the value of the monetary prize in question, and let us
re-label the driver and passenger (or pedestrian) as players 1 and 2. Then this
simple game of rival claimants can be written as follows:
Table 1: Payoffs to Players 1 and 2 Repecivey in a Simple Rival-Claimants Game.
Player 1 claims
Player 1 leaves

Player 2 claims
-c, -c
0, V

Player 2 leaves
V, 0
0, 0

This game has three equilibria. There is one equilibrium in which Player 1
(the driver) claims the prize and Player 2 leaves empty-handed. Given that Player
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1 is expected to claim, leaving empty-handed is better for Player 2 than suffering
the cost of conflict (0 > -c). When Player 2 is expected to leave, Player 1 should
confidently claim the money (V > 0). In this equilibrium, Player l's expected
payoff is V = 20, and Player 2's expected payoff is 0.
There is a second equilibrium in which Player 1 leaves and Player 2 claims.
Given that Player 1 is expected to leave, Player 2 should confidently claim the
prize. When Player 2 is expected to claim, Player 1 would be better off leaving to
avoid the cost of conflict. In this equilibrium, Player l's expected payoff is 0,
and Player 2's expected payoff is V = 20.
There is also a third equilibrium in which both players independently apply
the same randomized strategy. To compute this randomized strategy, first
consider Player l's decision problem, letting p denote the probability that Player
2 will leave. If Player 1 claims then his expected payoff is Vp + -c(1 -p), but if
Player 1 leaves then his payoff is 0. Notice that:
Vp + -c(1-p) = 0 whenp = c/(V+ c).
Thus, Player 1 is willing to randomize when Player 2 is expected to leave with
probability c/(V+c), because Player l's expected payoff is then $0 no matter
what Player 2 does about the money. Similarly, Player 2 is willing to randomize
when Player 1 leaves with probability c/(V+c). Thus, there is a symmetric
randomized equilibrium in which each player independently claims with
probability V/(V+c) or leaves with probability c/(V+c). In this randomized
equilibrium, each player's expected payoff is 0.
It may seem unrealistic to assume here that the players must decide, once
and for all, whether to claim the prize forever or leave immediately. In real life,
conflicts are dynamic open-ended processes where each party can regularly
reconsider the question of whether to quit or keep fighting. So let us now make
the game a bit more realistic by allowing that, if both players initially claim the
prize, then each of them can regularly reconsider the option of leaving after any
interval of conflict, say once every minute. In this dynamic context, the
parameter c should be reinterpreted as only the cost of struggling with the other
player for a minute. In a conflict for V = $20, the cost of arguing for one
minute might be c = $1 or less; so let us think of c as a small positive number,
much less than V:
V>C > 0.
In this dynamic version of the game, we allow that the players may both
continue to claim the money for any number of minutes, but they will each pay
the cost c for every minute that their conflict continues. This dynamic game
ends only when somebody finally decides to leave empty-handed, and then the
other player will get the $V prize, unless they both decide to leave at the same
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moment. (In equilibrium, the probability of such simultaneous departures will be
small.)
For each of the three equilibria that we found in the one-stage game, there
is a sequential equilibrium of this dynamic game in which the expected behavior
is the same at each one-minute round until somebody leaves. There is one
equilibrium, with expected payoffs (V, 0), in which Player 1 is always expected to
claim and Player 2 is always expected to leave in the next minute, no matter how
long they may have both tried to claim in the past. Similarly, there is a second
equilibrium, with expected payoffs (0, P), in which Player 2 is always expected to
claim and Player 1 is always expected to leave in the next minute. In either case,
when one player is expected to always persevere, it is rational for the other
player to leave as soon as possible, and a rational player should indeed persevere
when his or her opponent is expected to surrender soon.
The dynamic game also has a sequential equilibrium in which each player
independently applies the same randomized strategy, leaving with probability
c/(V+ c), every minute until somebody finally leaves. So the length of conflict is
random in this equilibrium. To verify that this scenario is a sequential
equilibrium, consider the position of one player after they have been in conflict
for some T minutes. If this player leaves now then his payoff will be -cT, where
eT is his sunk cost of past conflict. But if this player claims now for just one
more minute, then his payoff after another minute will be either V- cT or
-c(T+ 1), depending on whether the other player leaves or not in the next
minute. The probability of the other player leaving in the next minute is
c/(V+ c) in this equilibrium. Notice:
(V- cT)[c/(V+ c)] - c(T+ 1)[V/(V+ c)] = -cT.
So at every round, the player is always indifferent between leaving immediately
and continuing the conflict for one more minute, and so he is indeed willing to
randomize. In particular, each player could get his expected equilibrium payoff
by leaving immediately at the first minute, and so his expected payoff in this
equilibrium is 0. Thus, we have a symmetric randomized sequential equilibrium
in which both players get expected payoff 0. The expected duration of the
conflict is just long enough to exactly cancel out the expected gains from
possibly winning the $ Vprize. This equilibrium is called a war of attrition.
In the war-of-attrition equilibrium with V = 20 and c = I, each player's
probability of leaving at the next minute is always c/(V+ c) = 0.048 as long as
the conflict continues. The expected duration of conflict in this equilibrium is
9.76 minutes, and the probability of nobody getting the prize because of
simultaneous decisions to leave is only 0.024.
The above three equilibria have the property that they are stationary, in the
sense that the expected behavior stays the same no matter how long the conflict
continues. There are other non-stationary sequential equilibria that may be worth
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noting. In particular, consider an assumption that, if both players were to claim
at the first round of the game then, after the first minute of the game, they both
would be expected to play according to the randomized war-of-attrition
equilibrium in all subsequent rounds of the game. Because the players' expected
payoffs are both 0 in the war of attrition, predicting such behavior in the
subgame after the first minute will make the players' expected payoffs in the
whole dynamic game just equal to the payoffs that they get in the first minute.
So the three one-stage equilibria that we found for Table 1 (having expected
payoff allocations (V, 0) and (0, P) and (0, 0)) can also be extended to sequential
equilibria of the dynamic game with this equilibrium assumption that a war of
attrition will be played at all subsequent rounds if nobody leaves in the first oneminute round.
From our perspective, this multiplicity of equilibria should not be seen as
an embarrassing technical difficulty, but rather as just what we need to get the
"right" answer both for Basu's driver and passenger on one street and for the
economically-identical driver and pedestrian on a neighboring street. When sunk
costs and unchangeable past events are ignored, the economic structure of
decision-options and payoffs is identical in both situations. If the game had only
one equilibrium then we would have to predict the same outcome in both
situations. The multiplicity of equilibria allows us to suppose that, on one street,
the driver and passenger will focus on the equilibrium in which the passenger
immediately pays, because they both understand that the $20 rightfully belongs
to the driver. But on the other street, where a similar driver sees a pedestrian,
who has not ridden in the taxi but has similarly just dropped $20 on the ground,
they both understand that the $20 rightfully belongs to the pedestrian. So the
driver and pedestrian focus on the equilibrium in which the pedestrian
"rightfully" claims her $20 and the driver leaves empty-handed. Thus, justice can
be rationally supplied in our simple two-person society because the players'
shared understanding of justice may be the focal factor that determines the
equilibrium that they play, even though each player is a selfish materialist with
no intrinsic preference for justice.
Good cultural education may be important here, not because it taught
anyone to love justice above his or her own self interest, but because it taught
them all to expect justice. In this society, each individual is driven to give justice
by the others' expectation that justice will be given to them. Where a shared
cultural heritage has created a common understanding of what is owed to each
individual, then the imperative to let everyone have what is owed to him may be
derived from its being the focal equilibrium in a game of multiple equilibria.
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IV. A FABLE ABOUT THE FOUNDATION OF INSTITUTIONS
Let us now extend the preceding example to create a simple game-theoretic
model of the origins of political institutions. Imagine an island with a large
population of individuals. Every morning, these islanders assemble in various
groupings to talk and watch the sun rise. Then the islanders scatter for the day.
During the day, the islanders are randomly matched into pairs who meet at
random locations around the island, and each of these matched pairs plays a
rival-claimants game, as in Table 1 above, with a given prize worth V > 0 and a
given cost of conflict c > 0. Another round of this process is repeated every
day. Each player's objective is to maximize the present discounted total value of
his or her sequence of payoffs from these daily rival-claimants matches, with
some given discount factor 5 that is between 0 and 1.
One long-run equilibrium of this process is for everyone to play the
symmetric randomized equilibrium in his match each day. This equilibrium
represents an anarchic state of nature, where the value of every resource is
dissipated in conflict, and so everybody's expected payoff is always 0. But rising
up from this primitive anarchy, the players could develop cultural expectations
which break the symmetry among the matched players, so that they will share an
understanding of who should claim the prize and who should leave emptyhanded.
One possibility is that the islanders might develop a traditional
understanding that each player has a special "ownership" relationship with some
region of the island, such that a player is expected to claim whenever he is in the
region that he "owns." Notice that this system of ownership rights is a selfenforcing equilibrium, because the other player does better by leaving emptyhanded (getting 0 rather than -c) when he expects the "owner" to take his claim,
and so the owner should indeed claim the prize confidently. But such a system
of traditional claiming rights might fail to cover many matching situations where
no one has clear ownership. To avoid the wasteful symmetric equilibrium in
such cases, other ways of breaking the players' symmetry may be needed.
It might be possible to define more general principles that determine
claiming rights in more situations, but these principles will be effective only if
they are commonly understood by everybody. So the islanders might meet
together to discuss and ratify new principles to resolve more rivalries. Thus the
role of an assembly with legislative powers can be introduced here.
In cases that are not covered by any such generally understood laws, a pair
of matched players might instead invite some third player to act as an arbitrator.
Even though the arbitrator has no direct means to compel either player to use
any strategy, if the arbitrator recommends one of the equilibria then his
recommendation can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as long as each player
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believes that the other will play according to the focal arbitrator's
recommendation.
An arbitrator who wants to be fair could offer each player a positive
expected payoff by basing his recommendation on some random event like the
toss of a coin. He might recommend that Player 1 should claim and Player 2
should leave if the coin is Heads, but that Player 2 should claim and Player 1
should leave if the coin is Tails. Such random arbitration has the advantage that
it offers a positive expected payoff to both players before the coin is tossed. It
will not work, however, if the player who is disappointed after the coin toss
would demand that another arbitrator should toss another coin. So for the
players to be coordinated by a random device, they need some way to focus
themselves on one randomization that cannot be repeated or appealed.
To focus attention with no higher appeal, it would be best to consult the
highest possible authority. If the players share a cultural understanding that
certain unpredictable processes may be used by the fundamental Spirit of the
universe to answer questions, and that this Spirit will not allow itself to be
bothered about the same question more than once, then a recommendation that
is based on such a sacred randomization can serve as a focal coordination device
that cannot be appealed to any higher arbitrator. The oracle's recommendations
can be self-enforcing without any further intervention by the Spirit, provided
that the recommendations to the players form an equilibrium. Thus our model
can admit an important role of oracles and divination as an effective foundation
for social coordination!
To avoid disagreements about who is to provide focal arbitration in a case,
the islanders could develop a generally accepted system of leadership. That is,
the islanders might appoint one of their population to serve as a leader, and this
leader could announce each morning a set of instructions that specify which one
of the two players should be claiming the prize in each of the daily matches. As
long as the leader's instructions are clear and comprehensive, the understanding
that every player will obey these instructions is a self-enforcing equilibrium. A
player who claimed when he was expected to leave would only lower his
expected payoff from 0 to -c, given that the other player is expected to take the
prize here, as designated by the leader.
To make this system of government work on our island, the islanders only
need a shared understanding about who is the leader. Rituals in which the
fundamental Spirit of the universe is seen to sanctify the leader's authority might
also help to achieve such a focal consensus. But almost any imaginable criterion
See, for example, E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the A ande (Clarendon
1937); Omar Khayyam Moore, Divinaion--A New Perspective, 59 Am Anthropologist 69 (1957)
(offering another game-theoretic perspective on divination).
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or process could be used to identify or select the leader. The leader might be the
eldest among the islanders, or the tallest, or the one with the loudest voice. Or
the islanders might determine their leader by some contest, such as a chess
tournament, or by an annual election in which all the islanders vote. The
islanders could use any method of selection that they can understand, because
everyone will want to obey the selected leader's equilibrium instructions as long
as everyone else is expected to obey him. Thus, self-enforcing rules for a
political system can be constructed arbitrarily from the equilibrium-selection
problem in this game.
The islanders could impose limits to a leader's authority in this political
system. For example, there might be one leader whose instructions are obeyed
on the northern half of the island, and another leader whose instructions are
obeyed on the southern half. The islanders may even have ways to remove a
leader, such as when he loses some re-election contest or when he announces
arbitration decisions that violate some perceived limits. If a former leader tried
to make an announcement in his former domain of authority, then every player
would be expected to ignore this announcement as irrelevant cheap talk.
Mathematical models in social science are like fables or myths that we read
to get insights into the social world in which we live. Of course, the real world is
very different from the simple island of this fable. But as in this island,
coordination games with multiple equilibria are pervasive in any real society. The
basic point is that any successful society must develop leadership structures that
can coordinate people's expectations in situations of multiple equilibria. So the
first point of this fable is the basic social need for leadership and for political
institutions that can provide it.9
Suppose that the players' payoffs in our model can also be interpreted as
resources that increase their long-term reproductive fitness. Then an anarchic
island where these resources are wasted in the symmetric equilibrium would
sustain a much smaller population than another island where the players have
systems of authority to coordinate them on better equilibria. If players from
highly populated islands can colonize under-populated islands, taking with them
their cultural system of focal-equilibrium selection, then an archipelago of such
islands should eventually be inhabited only by people who have systems of
authority to coordinate them in matches where there are multiple equilibria.
Thus, in any cultural tradition that has survived into the modern world, we
should expect to find generally accepted systems of rights and authority that
provide effective focal coordination in most of the important games with
9

See also Randall L. Calvert, The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination,
and Communication, in Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek, eds, Modern Pohltical Economy: Old
Topics, New Directions 241-44 (Cambridge 1995).
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multiple equilibria that may arise in daily life. In this regard, experimental games
that are conducted in laboratories may be systematically different from real life.
When we study real institutions, we may expect multiple-equilibrium problems
to be resolved by existing social traditions of authority and culture, rather than
by some abstract mathematical properties of the equilibria themselves.
The second point of this fable is that the effectiveness of a political
institution may be derived simply from a shared understanding that it is in effect.
The remark that our islanders might choose their leader by a chess tournament is
meant to suggest that the rules of any higher-order social institution (here, all the
rules of a chess tournament) may itself be sustained as an equilibrium in a
broader and more fundamental game that has an enormous multiplicity of
equilibria. Applied social theorists must understand that there are games within
games in the real world, because the selection of a focal equilibrium in a big
game can effectively define an institution which itself can be the subject of
game-theoretic analysis. As Hardin has argued, any political system may be
understood as one of many possible equilibria of a more fundamental
coordination game of constitutional selection.' To the extent that political
leaders can create general rules and guidelines for the creation of new social and
economic institutions throughout society, the political process of selecting a
constitution may be viewed as the equilibrium-selection problem to solve all
other equilibrium-selection problems in society.
A third point of this fable is that norms of justice may be largely sustained
by systems of lower-order interactions among small groups of people. Although
resources could be rationally expended in paying leaders or in contests for
leadership, our model also admits equilibria where justice is provided at no cost
in every dyadic interaction. Any player can be costlessly motivated to leave,
when justice demands it, by the simple expectation that his opponent will justly
claim the prize. Of course, the dyadic basis of enforcement here is due to the
main simplifying assumption of this model: that the entire social system is built
up from elementary interactions among pairs of players whose coordination
problem would admit multiple equilibria even in isolation from all other
interactions. In real life, the elementary coordination problems may involve
larger numbers of people. But as in this model, the main deterrence to blatant
thievery may indeed be the difficulty of claiming things that other people expect
to be left for them. Thus, this model may be considered as an explanation of
how there can be so little need for adjudication in most daily social interactions.
Any system of equilibrium expectations about claiming rights in this model
can be considered as a system of justice for our islanders, although some systems
of justice might seem unfair to an outside observer. In particular, although
10
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thievery may be effectively deterred in this simple story, bullying is quite possible
in this model. There may be some bullies who are always expected to claim
everything from everyone else, and there are equilibria in which everybody else
acquiesces and leaves empty-handed in any interaction with such a bully. More
generally, the islanders might develop a class system (or pecking order) such
that, whenever players of different classes meet, the higher-class player always
claims, confident of success, and the lower-class player always leaves emptyhanded. If there is some initial doubt as to which of two groups will have the
higher status, then a broader war-of-attrition equilibrium can exist in which
members of these two groups continually claim against each other until
somebody on one side backs down and causes his group to be understood as
inferior in the class system.
V. BOUNDARIES AND LINKAGES BETWEEN DIFFERENT AREAS
OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT
The concept of a boundary is fundamental to the structure of international
relations, where even small infractions of a boundary typically evoke costly
defensive responses. Schelling showed that his theory of focal equilibria may
provide a basis for understanding the logic of such rigid boundaries." The
central insight is that a player's failure to fight vigorously against even a small
violation of a perceived boundary might lead others to believe that the player
would also surrender much larger areas. This fundamental insight can be
formalized by an extension of our rival-claimants game, where behavior in one
match may influence focal-equilibrium behavior in other subsequent matches.
For example, consider two players who will be matched every day to play
many instances of our rival-claimants game (Table 1), but each of these matches
will be located at a different place in a large field. We may imagine that the prizes
in these matches are fruits that ripen each day on bushes scattered throughout
the field. Suppose that Player l's home is north of the field, Player 2's home is
south of the field, and there is an old fence that crosses the field from east to
west. The fence may be small, but it is the most conspicuous feature in the field.
So the players may naturally focus on an equilibrium such that only Player 1 is
expected to claim in their matches north of the fence, and only Player 2 is
expected to claim in their matches south of the fence.
But suppose now that a bush has grown right through the fence, so that
there is confusion about which side it is on. There may be an equilibrium in
which both players claim in their matches here at the fence, even though the
conflict will cost them both c each day. In this equilibrium, each player is willing
to suffer the cost c each day because he anticipates that, if he ever failed to claim
11
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here at the boundary, then his opponent would expect to claim successfully
everywhere. That is, in this equilibrium, if either player ever left the boundary
prize uncontested, then their future behavior would switch to the equilibrium in
which this player would be expected to leave all prizes uncontested everywhere,
and so the other player would expect to claim successfully in all future matches
on both sides of the fence. Thus, our model can explain a costly protracted
conflict at a perceived boundary, as long as each player's expected cost of the
conflict here is less than the expected total value of all his claiming rights.
VI. INVESTMENT AND THE NEED FOR INTERTEMPORAL
LINKAGE IN EQUILIBRIA
In the preceding sections, we have seen many pure-strategy equilibria that
were equally efficient, in the sense of maximizing the expected sum of players'
payoffs. Our analysis was greatly simplified by using a structure (in Table 1) in
which any efficient outcome could be enforced as an equilibrium within each
match by itself, without any expectation that any future behavior might depend
on what the players do in the current match. But implicit in the original taxidriver story was that, to sustain a taxi industry, the players' focal equilibria in
rival-claimants matches must depend on whether the taxi driver has actually
given the other player a ride. In this section, we augment our basic model to
make this idea explicit. The result is a model that shows how efficient equilibria
may require that focal-equilibrium selection in different subgames should
depend on the players' past behavior. In these efficient equilibria, sunk costs
must matter.
So let us now augment the basic rival-claimants matches (from Table 1) by
adding two preliminary stages. At the first preliminary stage, Player 1 can select
any investment expense x > 0, where more investment will improve the prize.
At the second preliminary stage, after observing this investment x, Player 2
selects any payment y > 0 to give to Player 1. Finally, knowing both x and y,
Players 1 and 2 play a version of the rival-claimants game. But let us now assume
that the value of the prize to each player is some function V,(x) that depends on
Player l's initial investment. Thus, the players' payoffs now depend on whether
each leaves or claims the prize as in Table 2.
Table 2: Payoffs in a Rival-Claimants Game after 1's Investment x and 2's Paymenty.
Player I claims
Player 1 leaves
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Player 2 claims
y - x -c, -y - c
Y - x, V2(x) - Y

Player 2 leaves
VI (x)+ y - x, -y
y - x, -y

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Given any values of x and y from the preliminary stages of this game, the
three strategy-pairs that were equilibria in Table 1 are also equilibria in the thirdstage subgame here in Table 2. But in an equilibrium of the overall game, the
selection among these three equilibria could depend on the prior selections of x
andy. For example, they might expect player 2 to claim the prize if y > Y(x) but
Player 1 to claim the prize if y < Y(x), where Y(x) is some function that can be
interpreted as the "just price" for this prize with the investment x.
Let us assume that V2(x) > VI(x) > 0 for all x, and that the maximum of
V2(x) - x is achieved at some positive investment Y > 0; that is,
maxN~oV 2 (x)-x = Vz(y)-Y.

So total-payoff maximization would require that Player 1 should invest this
amount x and Player 2 should get the prize. There are some equilibria of this
three-stage game in which this efficient economic transaction is accomplished.
For example, total-payoff maximization could be achieved if the players' focalequilibrium expectations about who should claim the prize in the final stage
would be determined by comparing Player 2's second-stage payment to a justprice function of the form Y(x) = V2 (x) - K, where K is some constant such
that 0 _<K _<V2(3 ) - Y. With the highest possible K, Player 2 would just pay
Y when Player 1 invested this amount, and Player 2's expected equilibrium
payoff would be V2(Y ) - Y.
But any efficient equilibrium here requires a nontrivial intertemporal
linkage in the determination of expected equilibrium behavior for the final
subgame. If Player 2 would be always expected to claim the prize, regardless of
the prior investment and payment (x,y), then Player 1 would rationally choose
the minimal investment x = 0.

This example also highlights the dynamic consistency problem that
confronts a leader who has the power to select the focal equilibrium in any
subgame. If Player 2 is a strong leader who will be able to select the focal
equilibrium in the Table 2 subgame after x and y have been chosen, then Player
2 will always select the equilibrium where 2 claims and 1 leaves. Anticipating
such expropriation by the leader, Player 1 should not make any positive
investment, and so Player 2's expected payoff will be only V2 (0), which is less
than V2(x) - Y. Thus, a leader may be better off if he loses his ability to
influence people's equilibrium expectations after the beginning of the game.
Even an absolute monarch may want to impose limits on his own future
authority.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that truth and justice can be understood game-theoretically
as criteria for identifying a focal equilibrium in games with multiple equilibria.
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The cost of obtaining justice in society is indeterminate in our analysis, however.
In our island of rival claimants, we saw that leaders might judge their own cases
more favorably, which would be a cost for everyone else; but if everybody could
perfectly observe the leader's actions then there would also exist equilibria where
such a self-serving leader would be immediately replaced. When leaders can be
only imperfectly observed by their followers, however, then we may find some
necessary positive cost of inducing them to properly administer justice. Such a
model of the Law Merchant has been considered by Milgrom, North, and
Weingast, but in their analysis of games with potentially dishonest judges they
found that incentives for honest adjudication could be provided without paying
judges much more than the cost of their time. 2 So more work is needed to
develop models that might provide testable predictions about the cost of reliable
adjudication.
The questions of justice that we considered in our models here have
generally concerned property rights rather than contractual enforcement.
Contractual disputes involve failures of trust between parties who have entered
into some kind of relationship. But concepts of reputation, trust, and other
kinds of interpersonal relationships can be understood game-theoretically in
terms of multiple equilibria in repeated games (such as the repeated prisoners'
dilemma games in Milgrom, North, and Weingast's model of the Law
Merchant). In such repeated games, a pattern of mutually beneficial generosity
among players may be sustained as an equilibrium by a threat that, if any player
ever deviated from this pattern of cooperative behavior then everyone's
expected behavior would switch to another equilibrium in which the deviator's
expected payoff would be worse. That is, a good equilibrium in which players
trust each other may depend on the possibility of switching to other equilibria in
which the players do not trust each other. Thus, relationships of trust and
distrust can be understood as different equilibria in a repeated game.
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